1995-96 Supreme Court Preview: Mock Arguments in Romer v. Evans by Gerhardt, Michael J. & Maclin, Tracey
University of North Carolina School of Law
Carolina Law Scholarship
Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
1995
1995-96 Supreme Court Preview: Mock
Arguments in Romer v. Evans
Michael J. Gerhardt
University of North Carolina School of Law, gerhardt@email.unc.edu
Tracey Maclin
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Law Commons
Publication: William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
1995-96 SUPREME COURT PREVIEW: MOCK ARGUMENTS IN
ROMER v. EVANS
Michael J. Gerhardt*
Tracey Maclin*"
INTRODUCTION
On September 22, 1995, the Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the Col-
lege of William & Mary Law School held its eighth annual Supreme Court
Preview. Each year, legal scholars and journalists from around the country
gather to survey the upcoming Supreme Court term. This year's Preview
began with a moot court argument of Romer v. Evans,' Colorado's appeal
to the United States Supreme Court that was heard on October 10, 1995.
In November 1992, the Colorado electorate voted 53.4% to 46.6% to
include Amendment 2 in the Colorado Constitution.2 As adopted, Amend-
ment 2 states:
No protected status based on homosexual, lesbian, or
bisexual orientation. Neither the State of Colorado, through
any of its branches or departments, nor any of its agencies,
political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall
enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or
policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation,
conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or other-
wise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons
to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences,
protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of
the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing
The immediate result of Amendment 2 would have been to void local
antidiscrimination legislation in three Colorado cities-Aspen, Boulder and
Denver-and to prevent the enactment of any future protective legislation
" Professor of Law, The College of William & Mary. B.A., Yale University;
M.Sc., London School of Economics; J.D., University of Chicago.
.. Visiting Professor of Law 1995-96, Harvard Law School; Professor of Law, Bos-
ton University. B.A., Tufts University; J.D., Columbia University.
' Romer v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1092 (1995), granting cert. to 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo.
1994).
2 Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1338 (Colo. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct.
1092 (1995).
' COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b (enforcement stayed pending appeal).
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for the benefit of homosexuals absent a change in the Colorado Constitu-
tion.4
On November 12, 1992, respondents filed suit in state court.5 The trial
court issued a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Amend-
ment, concluding that the Amendment infringed on the fundamental "right
not to have the State endorse and give effect to private biases" affecting an
identifiable class.6 On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, but
rejected the lower court's reasoning, instead concluding that "laws may not
create unequal burdens on identifiable groups with respect to the right to
participate in the political process absent a compelling state interest., 7 Ac-
cordingly, the Colorado Supreme Court held that Amendment 2 was viola-
tive of the respondents' "fundamental right to participate equally in the
political process, and that any legislation or state constitutional amendment
which infringes on this right by 'fencing out' an independently identifiable
class of persons must be subject to strict judicial scrutiny."8 Applying the
Colorado Supreme Court's standard, the trial court permanently enjoined
Amendment 2, concluding that although the State had several compelling
interests, the Amendment was not sufficiently tailored so as to justify the
burden on the respondents' fundamental rights.9 The Colorado Supreme
Court affirmed."
The trial court litigated the issue of whether homosexuals and bisexuals
constituted a suspect or quasi-suspect class, but determined they were not."
The respondents did not appeal this issue to the Colorado Supreme Court,
and the Colorado court did not address the issue. 2
In the mock argument, Professor Michael Gerhardt represented the State
of Colorado, the petitioner, and Professor Tracey Maclin represented the
respondents. A panel of nine journalists played the part of the United States
Supreme Court. 3 It is important to stress that the legal arguments present-
ed do not necessarily represent beliefs and opinions of Professors Gerhardt
Evans, 882 P.2d at 1339; id. at 1364 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1339.
6 Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1273-74 (Colo. 1993).
Id. at 1279.
8 Id. at 1282.
Evans, 882 P.2d at 1340.
Id. at 1350.
Id. at 1341 n.3.
12 Id.
"3 The panel was made up of the following participants: Bill Banks, Professor of
Law, Syracuse University School of Law; Paul Barrett, Wall Street Journal; Joan
Biskupic, Washington Post; Richard Carelli, Associated Press; Aaron Epstein, Knight-
Ridder Newspapers; Jill Fisch, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School
of Law; Linda Greenhouse, New York Times; Tony Mauro, USA Today; and David
Savage, Los Angeles Times.
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and Maclin; the decision as to which professor would argue which side was
determined by a toss of a coin.
ROY ROMER,
Petitioner,
-vs.- No. 94-1039
RICHARD G. EVANS,
Respondent.
Williamsburg, Virginia
Friday, September 22, 1995
Oral Argument in the above-entitled matter:
BEFORE:
BILL BANKS, Chief Justice
PAUL BARRETT, Associate Justice
JOAN BISKUPIC, Associate Justice
RICHARD CARELLI, Associate Justice
AARON EPSTEIN, Associate Justice
JILL FISCH, Associate Justice
LINDA GREENHOUSE, Associate Justice
TONY MAURO, Associate Justice
DAVID SAVAGE, Associate Justice
APPEARANCES:
PROFESSOR MICHAEL GERHARDT, William & Mary Law School,
on behalf of Petitioner.
PROFESSOR TJACEY MACLIN, Visiting Professor of Law 1995-96,
Harvard Law School; Professor of Law, Boston University School of
Law, on behalf of Respondents.
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PROCEEDINGS
ORAL ARGUMENT OF
PROFESSOR MICHAEL GERHARDT
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER
MR. GERHARDT: May it please the Court. As this Court well knows,
the Fourteenth Amendment sets a floor with respect
to equal protection below which no state law may
go.14 In this case, the question is whether the Four-
teenth Amendment prohibits the state from also using
that floor as a ceiling. Our answer is no. In our sys-
tem of federalism, the state or its people have the
final say on how to fill the space above the floor set
by the United States Constitution.
In this case, neither the state of Colorado nor its
political subdivisions are under any constitutional
compulsion to pass legislation to grant special status
to gays, lesbians and bisexuals. These groups won
political victories for themselves in certain state
agencies and political subdivisions. For example,
three Colorado cities enacted sexual orientation ordi-
nances regulating employment, housing and public
accommodations.15 The state Civil Rights Commis-
sion had voted to recommend that the General As-
sembly expand the state's Civil Rights Act to ban
discrimination based on sexual orientation- 16
THE COURT: Counselor.
MR. GERHARDT: Yes?
THE COURT: Because of Colorado's Amendment 2, how would
somebody then be able to bring any kind of discrimi-
nation case against an employer in the city where he
14 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
" See Evans, 882 P.2d at 1364 (Erickson, J., dissenting). Aspen, Denver, and Boul-
der had enacted ordinances protecting against discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. Id. (Erickson, J., dissenting).
16 Id. at 1364 n.7 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
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MR. GERHARDT:
THE COURT:
MR. GERHARDT:
THE COURT:
MR. GERHARDT:
might previously have been able to bring such a case
under those ordinances? How would this exactly
work now, as you have explained the ordinances?
Well, the purpose of the Amendment, plain and sim-
ple, was to allow the state to occupy a neutral posi-
tion with respect to the preferred status of gays,
lesbians, and bisexuals. Consequently, the recourse
left open to those groups is to go through the same
referendum process that they opposed and lost-and
it was a political loss. The critical aspect is that it
was a process previously set up by Colorado law. It's
a legitimate process.
But are you saying that before Amendment 2, some-
body who would have been denied a job because of
his sexual orientation, or denied housing because of
sexual orientation, could have sued under these vari-
ous city ordinances, and now they wouldn't be able
to? I'm trying to figure out in terms of a discrimina-
tion case.
In terms of a discrimination case, any local laws that
allow any discrimination case to be brought on the
basis of sexual orientation have been superseded by
this referendum, which has now been enshrined in
the state constitution. 7 Consequently, anyone who is
interested in bringing a discrimination case against
the state government still has recourse under the
Fourteenth Amendment. If the complaint of discrimi-
nation is against private individuals, the case has no
basis in state law at present.
Doesn't this amendment drop homosexuals, bisexuals
below that floor? Doesn't it make them unequal be-
cause only they-not any other group in the state of
Colorado-cannot participate in the political process
with any hope of success.
We don't think so, Your Honor. In fact, what this
case represents is a fundamental aspect of federalism.
There are always winners and losers in the political
"7 COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b (1994) (enforcement stayed pending appeal).
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THE COURT:
MR. GERHARDT:
process, and in this case, gays, lesbians, and bisexu-
als won various political victories across the state.
They have now suffered a loss, and seek constitution-
al immunity from suffering the consequences of that
loss.
Counselor, as I think Justice Epstein was suggesting,
doesn't the whole concept of your argument about
floors and ceilings, and so on, assume the answer to
the question that we are here to answer? And that is,
before we get to federalism, state sovereignty, all that
kind of stuff, what is the Fourteenth Amendment
floor?
Let me ask you a question. Suppose the city of Boul-
der, Colorado had an ordinance which said that po-
lice shall enforce the law against assault unless the
victim of the assault happens to be gay. In that case,
the police may not enforce the law against assault.
Would that be constitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment?
I think that obviously would be subjected to a ratio-
nal basis test."8 I suspect the answer would be no.
Police are state actors. State actors still must comply
with the Fourteenth Amendment.
I might also add though, that--with respect to the as-
sault law-assault in general is prohibited against all
citizens of the state. 9 Gays and lesbians are still
citizens of the state, and as such they are on the
same plane. They now occupy an equal status with
other citizens of the state. They simply don't have a
preferred status from other citizens. All citizens are
protected from assault. These same citizens are pro-
tected from assault.
" Under the rational basis test, two prongs must be satisfied. First, the purpose of
the statute must be legitimate. Second, the means must be rationally related to the ends.
See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); see also Minneso-
ta v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
'9 COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 18-3-201 to 18-3-204 (1994).
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THE COURT:
MR. GERHARDT:
THE COURT:
MR. GERHARDT:
THE COURT:
MR. GERHARDT:
THE COURT:
MR. GERHARDT:
THE COURT:
MR. GERHARDT:
Now you talk about preferred status-special status, I
think you said. Aren't we rather talking about special
disabilities?
I don't think so, Your Honor. I think the whole pur-
pose of the people's referendum was in fact to re-
move the special status that was only granted through
law-through the laws that had been passed by vari-
ous cities, the governor's actions, and the General
Assembly.
Can you name any other group in the state of Colo-
rado-strippers, telemarketers, left-handed peo-
ple-who can or who cannot do what the homosexu-
als here are denied?
I think, frankly, every group you mentioned, Your
Honor, is in the same status as these groups.
Except that only the homosexual group, only the gay
group, is prohibited from passing an ordinance to
protect them against discrimination.
.That's true.
The others are not, are they?
It's true that the referendum has that consequence,
Your Honor, except for the fact there is still a pro-
cess by which that referendum can be overridden.
That referendum itself was properly processed, and
the fact remains that I think none of those other
groups are likely to win a political victory of the sort
that these people won in order to gain special status.
Is there any other group in Colorado that's so dis-
advantaged?
I can't say off the top of my head whether that's true
or not, although I suspect that none of the groups
you mentioned, Your Honor, are any likelier to be
able to obtain special status in either the cities or
across the state.
1995] 645
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THE COURT:
MR. GERHARDT:
THE COURT:
MR. GERHARDT:
THE COURT:
MR. GERHARDT:
THE COURT:
But Justice Epstein's point is that the Boy Scouts
could obtain an ordinance, but the gays and lesbians
would need to amend the state constitution to gain
that status.
I think that's of no consequence, Your Honor. I think
that the reality is that most citizens occupy a status in
which they are not given preferred treatment, in a
variety of contexts, against both state action and
private action. What this referendum tries to achieve,
through plain language, is to simply even the playing
field. The reality is that the respondents used the
political process to obtain advantages for themselves.
They've lost those advantages for themselves as a
consequence of the referendum. The only way to win
back those advantages, that is to say the only way to
win back a status superior to that of other citizens, is
through the referendum process.
Before we go further, could you clarify for us what
the state's interest is here in the enactment of the
amendment. What's being accomplished?
Well, for one thing, what's .being accomplished is
what I have just stated-the removal of the special
status. The people are trying to achieve as best as
possible a neutral position for the state under these
circumstances. In other words the people are leaving
to the political process-
But there's some affirmative interest that the state
has identified here. Is there not something having to
do with familial privacy or something like that?
Well, there are a variety of state interests that are im-
plicated here, one of which is what I have just stated.
Another is, obviously, that the people just may have
decided, like those of any state may, that the exper-
iment of granting special privileges hasn't worked
out.
There's been some moral judgment here, has there
not? Are you saying there have been no moral judg-
ments behind Amendment 2?
646 [Vol.- 4:2
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MR. GERHARDT:
THE COURT:
MR. GERHARDT:
THE COURT:
MR. GERHARDT:
THE COURT:
MR. GERHARDT:
THE COURT:
MR. GERHARDT:
There are many reasons that are legitimate to support
this referendum, one of which is, as the record re-
flects, that the people of Colorado decided that the
special status of various laws granted to these groups
in a sense coerced other people to interact with them
privately, other people who may not have wanted to,
and so there are-
Could you give me a factual example of this coerced
interaction?
Sure. As the record reflects, for example, one of the
witnesses testified that under similar circumstances in
another state, with respect to a similar city ordinance,
she had not wanted to have any roommates who were
attracted to her or who might have any sort of inter-
est toward her that was anything except platonic. She
didn't want a male roommate; she didn't want a
lesbian roommate. She was, in fact, prosecuted for
violating the city ordinance which precluded discrim-
ination in housing on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion.'
There's no exception for a situation where you would
have to have someone in your own room?
None at all.
Maybe that's a flaw in there, in the state ordinance.
Ordinarily there are exceptions to discrimination-
Well, I think that's a-
-for places where there are just a few units.
Your Honor, the point is that these laws may not
have been wise to begin with. The people of a state
can make mistake in enacting a law like Amendment
2, for perhaps it's not the wisest thing the people of
Colorado ever did. It also may not have been wise to
have the antidiscrimination laws in the first place,
20 Brief for Petitioners at 15, Romer v. Evans, cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 1092 (1995)
(No. 94-1039).
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THE COURT:
MR. GERHARDT:
THE COURT:
THE COURT:
MR. GERHARDT:
THE COURT:
MR. GERHARDT:
because they simply created frictions and fractures
that the people of the state can try to remedy in this
manner.
Was that a typical example? How have these ordi-
nances been used, and how have they been invoked
regularly? I'm concerned about the removal of them
just so the people won't have some recourse. Can
you tell us a little bit about what the record reflects?
With respect to the removal, Your Honor, I think it's
important to stress that Amendment 2 places these
groups in the same position they would have been in
if the ordinances had never been enacted in the first
place. I think it's an important point to make because
if there's no constitutional compulsion for these
ordinances-
But it doesn't place them in the same position be-
cause they can no longer propose such an enactment.
They no longer have the power to go to a city coun-
cil and begin such a legislative process. That's quite
a difference.
Except for the amendment process, which is a very
high hurdle.
They retain the same opportunity that other people
have through the referendum process, which is the
process one goes through to gain constitutional
protections.
Just not legislative protection. They're treated dif-
ferently from all other Coloradans with respect to the
ability to seek protection fiom their local govern-
ment.
Your Honor, there are only two limitations on any
state legislative restriction. One is whether the leg-
islative restriction burdens a racial minority,2 the
2 See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971);
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886) (holding that administrative discrimination against Chinese was suspect).
[Vol. 4:2
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THE COURT:
MR. GERHARDT:
THE COURT:
MR. GERHARDT:
THE COURT:
other is whether it violates a fundamental right.22
Neither of these is involved in this case. As a con-
sequence, this Court has to review the constitution-
ality of this referendum with enormous latitude under
the rational basis test.
So you are denying there's any pollution of political
power here.
None whatsoever.
Counsel, this court rejected that exact same argument
with respect to the ordinance issued. That was Hunt-
er v. Erickson,23 from which the Colorado Supreme
Court reminds us-
We think Hunter is a very different case, Your Hon-
or, for a couple of reasons. I think it's clear that
Hunter involved a suspect class.24 The emphasis on
the fact that a suspect class was being burdened was
of great importance to the Court. In addition, I think
it's important to recognize that in Hunter, the city
referenda that was enacted in a sense created two
political hurdles for blacks to go through with respect
to fair housing.' And the Court in reviewing the
referendum, made the decision that putting additional
hurdles in the way of a racial minority, for whom the
Fourteenth Amendment was, in fact, primarily de-
signed to protect, triggered strict scrutiny.26
Haven't we gotten far beyond the notion that the
Fourteenth Amendment was only designed to protect
22 See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (holding un-
constitutional annual poll tax imposed as prerequisite to exercising right to vote).
23 393 U.S. 385 (1969). In Hunter, the Court struck down an amendment to the city
charter of Akron, Ohio that required majority approval of any city housing ordinance
passed to combat discrimination on the basis of "race, color, religion, national origin or
ancestry." Id. at 387 (quoting Akron City Charter § 137).
24 Id. at 391.
23 Id. at 389-90. "By adding § 137 to its charter the City of Akron... not only
suspended the operation of the existing ordinance forbidding housing discrimination, but
also required the approval of the electors before any future ordinance could take effect."
Id.
26 Id. at 391-92.
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MR. GERHARDT:
THE COURT:
MR. GERHARDT:
THE COURT:
MR. GERHARDT:
black people? Doesn't the Fourteenth Amendment
extend far beyond that in the current state of our
law?
It obviously depends on the context, Your Honor,
and in this context, I think it's important to recognize
that the Court rejected extending Hunter in James v.
Valtierra.27 James involved a class of poor people
who were subjected to almost exactly the same bur-
den as the racial minority was in Hunter, except the
Court refused to apply Hunter to that context, and
instead upheld the state amendment." I think James
is an opinion that's awfully important to this case.
But you're not arguing that the Equal Protection
Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment only applies to
race, are you?
Not at all, but I think-
What's the distinction between your case and the
way this Court has applied the Equal Protection
Clause to gender?
Well, I think one critical thing to keep in mind is
that where the people of a state are exercising their
sovereign authority to redefine allocation of power
within the state, the process is normally accorded
great deference by this Court. There have only been
two exceptions thus far in history to state enactments
on that issue, and they had to do with a racial minor-
ity and fundamental rights. With respect to women
who haven't been implicated in any of those other
cases, in other contexts, this Court obviously, for the
most part, has used intermediate scrutiny.29
27 402 U.S. 137 (1971). In James, the plaintiffs challenged a California constitution-
al provision that required a majority vote of electors in local governments to approve of
low-rent housing projects. Id. at 139-40. Plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued that Hunter
precluded enforcement of the California provision. Id. at 141.
28 Id. at 143.
29 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (noting that "classifications by
gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related
to achievement of those objectives"); see also Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981)
(upholding male-only draft registration); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464
650 [Vol. 4:2
ROMER v. EVANS MOCK ARGUMENTS
THE COURT:
MR. GERHARDT:
THE COURT:
MR. GERHARDT:
Mr. Gerhardt, do you think it would be okay for
Colorado officials to discriminate against gays in an
affirmative way? In other words, suppose I'm a may-
or in a small town in Colorado. This amendment
takes effect, and I say I'm going to put out a state-
ment that as of Monday, I want all the gays and
lesbians fired who work in our city government at
any level. I want them fired because I think I've
learned about this amendment, and these people don't
have any right to equal treatment, so I don't care
whether they're good or bad employees-I want
them fired. Is that okay?
That decision, Your Honor, would still have to be
subjected to Fourteenth Amendment analysis, and
under that decision, which we think ought to be
subjected to the rational basis test, it's conceivable
that such a policy might not be found to be satisfac-
tory. In other words, it may be that the Court would
have a difficult time conceiving of a reasonable basis
for that kind of decision.30
All right. Well, let's say I don't like gays. I've read
about this amendment, and I've seen the discussion,
and people say they're not good people. I'm free to
discriminate now, so why not?
Well, I think, Your Honor, there are a couple dif-
ferent things involved here. One is if animus or prej-
udice is the reason for a law, legal action, or govern-
mental action, as in Cleburne, this Court will strike it
down.B1 If, however, there is a rational basis for the
law that is legitimate and related to the achievement
of the government's legitimate objective, then this
Court will uphold it.32 In the circumstances you are
postulating, it sounds to me like prejudice is the sole
reason for the mayor's action.
(1981) (upholding statutory rape law under which only men could be held liable).
30 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985). In
Cleburne, the Court was unable to find any rational basis for a city requirement that a
group home for the mentally retarded obtain a special use permit. Id.
3' See, e.g., id. at 450.
32 Id. at 440.
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THE COURT:
MR. GERHARDT:
THE COURT:
MR. GERHARDT:
THE COURT:
MR. GERHARDT:
Wasn't prejudice the main reason here? Wasn't it ho-
mophobia?
Not at all, Your Honor. It seems to me that if the
state has the discretion to grant special benefits in the
first instance, it ought to be able to retain the authori-
ty to withdraw them if it so chooses. Your Honor, I
don't know of any constitutional provision that says
a state is estopped from ever withdrawing an exper-
iment, once it's put it into motion, if it decides for
whatever reason that it doesn't think the experiment
is in the best interests of the people of Colorado.
What's your response to the argument that's in a line
of cases starting with Reynolds v. Sims? 33 This
Court has said that once you dilute the power of a
popular group to influence the political process, you
have violated the Equal Protection Clause.34
Well, Reynolds v. Sims and the cases that you are re-
ferring to obviously again deal primarily with the
voting rights of blacks. I would point out that there's
no dilution of a vote here, nor is there a racial minor-
ity.
Not a dilution of a vote, the dilution of political
power to influence the political process?
Your Honor, states override local decisionmaking all
the time. It's commonplace that either through legis-
lation or referendum, local decisionmaking ordinanc-
33 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Reynolds was the Court's first articulation of the "one per-
son, one vote" principle. For later cases developing this principle, see Kirkpatrick v.
Presiler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969) (requiring states to make "good-faith effort to achieve
precise mathematical equality"); Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713
(1964) (holding that apportionment schemes violating "one person, one vote" principle
are not made constitutional by approval by majority of voters).
34
[T]he Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a bicam-
eral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis .... [An
individual's right to vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when
its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when compared with votes of citizens
living in other parts of the State."
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568.
652 [Vol. 4:2
ROMER V. EVANS MOCK ARGUMENTS
THE COURT:
MR. GERHARDT:
THE COURT:
MR. GERHARDT:
THE COURT:
es get overridden all the time. And if the people who
lose in that kind of process are allowed to bring any
kind of constitutional claim, simply because they lost,
state government comes to a grinding halt.
Counselor, you are short on time. I'm going to give
you a question that you can answer yes or no.
Yes, Your Honor.
As I understand it, 53% of the citizens in Colorado
voted for this amendment.35 Let me give you a hy-
pothetical: Let's say that 95% of the Americans who
live outside of Colorado think this is just terrible
public policy. Does that affect the rational basis
standard one iota?
I think it does, Your Honor, except it strengthens the
people's argument in this case. The reason I think it
does is because it demonstrates the political power of
the group that we have at issue here. I might point
out, for example, that this same group, these groups
we have been talking about, persuaded Congre~s to
place sexual orientation on the list of hate crimes
within the federal hate crimes statute. 36 So, for ex-
ample, with respect to the earlier question about
assault, such assault might be actionable under the
federal statute. In addition, I think the political victo-
ries that were achieved reflect the fact that the groups
we're talking about are not politically powerless.
This all goes to whether we have a discreet and
insular minority.37
Wait a minute. Neither are women, neither are people
over 40, neither are the disabled, and we protect
them.
" See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1338 (Colo. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct.
1092 (1995).
36 Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 534 note (Supp. V 1993).
31 See generally United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) ("Preju-
dice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon
is protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry.").
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MR. GERHARDT:
THE COURT:
MR. GERHARDT:
THE COURT:
MR. GERHARDT:
THE COURT:
MR. GERHARDT:
THE COURT:
MR. GERHARDT:
We protect some of them specially, Your Honor, but
there are left-handed people, there are red haired
people, there are tall people, there are short people,
there are overweight people-all those people, by the
way, have characteristics that are far more visible
than the characteristics of these groups, which would
qualify the former as discreet and insular groups
within a narrow reading of those terms-but we
don't give any of those groups special protections.
Are you saying this group is not protected because it
doesn't have an immutable characteristic?
This group is not given special status because we
would argue it is not a discreet minority, and because
it's within the state's discretion to withdraw special
benefits that might have been conferred on it as such.
Let's come to rational basis. What is your best argu-
ment for a legislative, for a governmental purpose
here?
I think the best argument for a legitimate governmen-
tal purpose is that the state of Colorado can choose
to allocate its resources in whatever manner it sees
fit. Billions of dollars have been spent on cases that
have arisen under the laws that were overridden and
superseded by the referendum. The state of the Colo-
rado can't fund every special interest group, or every
special group's interest.
And so you take out the less deserving?
We take out-it has nothing to do with being less
deserving, Your Honor.
That's opinion.
It has to do with drawing the line, and the people of
the State of Colorado can reach a judgement that
they are now going to limit the class of special
groups.
On what basis?
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I see my time is up, Your Honor.
You may answer the question.
They may do so, Your Honor, on the basis of-
On what basis do you ignore centuries of discrimina-
tion against homosexuals and say they are less de-
serving?
Well, Your Honor, there are a couple of points here.
One is that I think the groups we're talking about in
this case have won enormous political victories. That
doesn't suggest to me that these groups have the
same degree of political powerlessness as any of the
groups this Court has ever recognized as being enti-
tled to strict scrutiny. That's the first thing. Second, I
don't think these groups have the same kind of char-
acteristics as those other groups-immutable, visible
traits which set people apart-and that makes en-
forcement of discrimination laws that are based on
the abuse of those characteristics much easier.
Is that the same as saying a homosexual can just
change their behavior?
It has nothing to do with behavior, Your Honor.
You talk about immutable characteristics.
No, I'm talking about how the Court has traditionally
found minorities to be discreet and insular, and it
would be our argument that we're dealing with nei-
ther characteristic in this case. And that the people of
Colorado can make a decision that they want to allo-
cate their scarce economic resources in other direc-
tions, perhaps directions that are aimed, in their judg-
ment, to bringing the people of Colorado closer to-
gether, rather than dividing them apart into special
groups.
And to make a uniform rule.
And to make a uniform, neutral rule.
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If you wanted a uniform rule, why does this amend-
ment rule out state antidiscrimination laws which are
uniform?
Your Honor, again I would remind the Court that this
amendment, this referendum seeks simply to remove
special status that other laws-local laws-and some
state agency decisions granted. In doing so, it returns
and places the groups in this case still within the
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. As far as
the private sector is concerned, these people may still
influence federal law, and they have done so, as well
as the private associations with which we all must
live.
Thank you, Mr. Gerhardt. Mr. Maclin?
ORAL ARGUMENT OF
PROFESSOR TRACEY MACLIN
ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS
May it please the Court, my name is Tracey Maclin,
counsel for the Respondents. The Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that
"[n]o state shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."38 The
Respondents submit that the command of the Equal
Protection Clause is violated when the state makes
some persons ineligible for the protection of the laws
for an entire category of mistreatment. In this case,
Colorado, through Amendment 2, has declared that a
group of persons is ineligible from protection against
discrimination, however wrongful or unnecessary that
discrimination may be.
If, for example, Colorado had declared that some
groups within the state, say law professors or hot dog
vendors, were ineligible from protection of the
law-for example, from physical assault or rob-
bery-and again, not only for today, but for all exist-
ing laws, I have no doubt that this Court would de-
38 U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
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clare that a per se violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. This same principle applies to Amendment 2,
which mandates that gays and lesbians---citizens of
Colorado-be denied the same protection of the laws
that every other citizen of Colorado is entitled to
receive. This is not a case about whether there may
be adequate justification to deny gays, lesbians, or
any other group, less favorable treatment, or to have
them receive less favorable treatment in particular
circumstances, and by what standard that law should
be judged. Rather, the central issue is whether the
Fourteenth Amendment allows the State to exclude a
group of persons from the protection of its laws on
the basis of a personal characteristic, that may not be
the basis of any protection-any protection-pursu-
ant to state law, from any form of discrimination,
again however invidious or unwarranted that discrim-
ination may be.
But counsel, is it accurate to say that Amendment 2
operates to withdraw from gay people the same pro-
tection that everybody else gets? For instance, I don't
think there's anything in Colorado law that would
protect law professors as a class if somebody didn't
want to rent to a law professor-
No, but if Colorado said that law professors were not
entitled to the protection of Colorado law-for exam-
ple, from physical assault or from robbery-and only
law professors shall not receive the protections of
Colorado law, I doubt if that would be an open and
shut case to say that's a violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. Even though law professors are not a
suspect class, and even though there is no fundamen-
tal right involved there. What this statute does say is
that gays and lesbians are not entitled to any protec-
tion under current law, or even future law, when it
comes to discrimination at any level of state govern-
ment.
I don't think it says that. It protects them against as-
sault just as it does law professors.
Well, it does not protect them against discrimination.
If I may read the last portion of the amendment, it
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says, "shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or
entitle any person or class of persons to have or
claim any minority status, quota preferences, protect-
ed status or claim of discrimination."39 That is the
core of Respondents' argument. This amendment
says that gays and lesbians shall not be entitled to
make any claim or be entitled to receive any relief
where they are claiming that they are being discrimi-
nated against on the basis of their sexual orientation.
For example, if Colorado law were to say that you
should not be denied housing on an arbitrary basis,
and if a gay or lesbian person was denied housing
because of their sexual orientation, they would not be
entitled to any relief--even if a judge were to find
that this was an arbitrary decision based on their
sexual orientation-because this is a claim of dis-
crimination on the basis of their sexual orientation.
What do you say to Mr. Gerhardt's main argument,
though, that these sorts of protections, as he calls
them, should have never been enacted in the first
place? As if it were saying that left-handers get
something special.
With all due respect, Your Honor, this is not about
special treatment. If it's about anything, it's about se-
lective denial. This amendment makes gays and
lesbians worse off than other individuals. This is not
about selective treatment.
And there's no way that we need to accord gays and
lesbians any kind of special treatment at all?
Absolutely not. Absolutely not. This amendment
makes them worse off because, for example, it does-
n't say that heterosexuals shall not be denied claims
of discrimination or even special treatment. Hetero-
sexuals are free to go out and make claims of dis-
crimination, indeed they're free to go out and ask for
special treatment. It's only gay and lesbian individu-
als who cannot make these claims, and that makes
them worse off. Every other citizen of Colorado is
" COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b (enforcement stayed pending appeal).
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* free to bring a claim on the basis of, for example, of
their marital status.
How would a heterosexual bring such a claim?
For example, if they claim that they were arbitrarily
denied housing by a landlord based on their marital
status, a judge would be free to say that Colorado
law protects against discrimination on the basis of
marital status. In some instances, it protects against
discrimination on the basis of that you are a smoker.
Those individuals are free to come in and argue to a
judge that this is an arbitrary discrimination. Howev-
er, if a gay or lesbian person were denied housing on
the basis of their sexual orientation, the judge would
not be free to find that this is an arbitrary
discrimination. A gay or lesbian person would be
precluded from bringing the same claim or a similar
claim at every level of state government.
Along with a lot of other groups-smokers, non-
smokers.
No, that's not true. That's not true, Your Honor.
Where do they get their protection?
They're free to come in and make a claim on the
basis of an arbitrary denial, and if a judge were to
find that that's arbitrary on the basis of the fact that
they're left-handed, red-headed, or overweight,
they're free to receive protection of Colorado's law.
It's only gays and lesbians that are denied a remedy.
So this is not a case about special treatment. My
colleague says, "Well, the state is simply trying to be
even-handed." The state is not even-handed here, it's
only gays and lesbians-
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Didn't the statute that we upheld in Bowers' treat
gays with less than equal treatment? Didn't that
accord them less than an equal status?
Well, we're not arguing that gays and lesbians are
entitled to suspect classification. I would be very
happy if this court were to overrule Bowers, but you
don't have to overrule Bowers to affirm the lower
court decision.
But if we upheld a statute that criminalized conduct
engaged in by the class at issue here, surely we can
uphold a statute that simply strikes a middle ground.
I disagree with that, Your Honor. As I said, this is
not a case about a situation where Colorado has
decided that there's adequate justification to single
out gays and lesbians for less favorable treatment.
Colorado is saying that under all circumstances, no
matter how rational or irrational-under all circum-
stances-gays and lesbians are never going to be
allowed to bring a claim of discrimination. All cir-
cumstances! It would be one thing if they were to
say that in a particular situation, gays and lesbians
are not entitled to the same protection that other
individuals or groups receive. For example, if the
State were to say: "Well, we think that gays and
lesbians should not be allowed to adopt children
because of particular circumstances." Here Colorado
is saying that under each and every instance, no
matter how arbitrary or how warranted, you cannot
bring a claim of discrimination if you are gay or
lesbian.
Your opponent was trying to avoid making the claim
based on a moral sense but in fact that is what lies
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). In Bowers, the Supreme Court found
constitutional a Georgia statute that criminalized sodomy. Id. at 189. Although neutral
on its face, the majority phrased the issue as "whether the Federal Constitution confers
a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy." Id. at 198. The majority
answered that inquiry in the negative. Id.
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behind this amendment. Why are states denied the
ability to use this type of legislation to enforce the
moral sense that certain lifestyles are inappropriate?
The state is free to make moral judgments and have
those judgments enforced into law. However-
Why should the Court second-guess those judg-
ments?
This is not about second-guessing moral judgments.
This is about a per se denial of the Equal Protection
Clause. The state may decide that law professors, for
example, are not morally fit because they train law-
yers, but if Colorado were to say that law professors
shall not be entitled to the protection of laws
in-again I use the example of a case of assault-I
have no doubt that it would be an open and shut-
That's a false comparison. Colorado has not said that
homosexuals can be assaulted in the street.
No, but they have said that homosexuals cannot bring
any claim of discrimination. That's their language of
Amendment 2, "claim of discrimination. 41
That's not true. If a homosexual happens to be a
racial minority, he can bring a claim. You're say-
ing-
If it's a racial minority, but if the person is simply
gay or lesbian, they cannot have that status be the
basis of any claim of discrimination, and that is, with
all due respect to Justice Epstein, what the law de-
mands. It mandates that. My colleague said, "Well,
they lost in the political process." Sure gays and
lesbians retain the right to vote, but state law here
mandates that they shall never succeed when they
bring a claim of discrimination. This is not even-
handedness on the part of the State.
Just to clarify what you think this amendment takes
41 COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b (1994) (enforcement stayed pending appeal).
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away from gays, what do you think a gay person in
the state of Alaska-where maybe there are no laws
one way or another regarding sexual status or sexual
preference-what can a gay person in Alaska do that
Amendment 2 says a gay person in Colorado can't?
Again, I use the example of housing. If Alaska, for
example, prohibits arbitrary housing discrimination,
that individual is free to come in and to say, "The
landlord has denied me housing because of my sexu-
al orientation." The judge might find it arbitrary
under Alaska law to deny someone housing because
of sexual orientation. If that same case were brought
in Colorado, you can't provide protection. And again,
it applies to all branches of the state government. It
says "shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regu-
lation, ordinance or policy,' 42 so it's preventing
state judges from coming up with laws and policies
that protect gay and lesbian individuals-
Does it really reach that far? Before the amendment
was passed, Colorado Springs had no law protecting
homosexuals. No system of allowing them to make
claims of discrimination. How are they any worse off
now under Amendment 2?
Maybe not under Colorado Springs law, if Colorado
Springs law is as you stated, but in some places
where they-For example, housing is the one ex-
ample that I know applies statewide. Housing dis-
crimination cannot be arbitrary.43 A gay or lesbian
individual cannot come to court and make a claim of
having been denied housing because of sexual orien-
tation. Even if the judge were to find that the denial
is, as a matter of Colorado law, an arbitrary denial of
housing. The gay or lesbian cannot do that now
under Amendment 2. So that's how they are made
worse off. Every other individual in Colorado,
whether it be law professors, hot dog vendors, or
left-handed people, can come in and make the argu-
ment, and if the judge were to agree with them, they
42 Id.
41 COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-502 (1994).
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How about other groups like smokers or alcoholics.
Suppose some heavy smoker is in a work place and
gets fired because all his fellow employees don't like
the smoke. He brings a claim of discrimination, wins
a million dollars, and the people of Colorado get
angry and say we're going to put on ballot a new
amendment that says no one can bring any claim of
discrimination, preference or minority status based on
smoking. You can't bring any claim from now on, in
any court, based on the fact that you are a smoker or
heavy smoker. That's just not going to be heard as
far as claims of discrimination. Is that unconstitution-
al?
Well, Colorado protects smokers.
No, but let's say they change their views. Yes,
you're right, they do have a smoker's bill of rights in
Colorado." Suppose a lot of people get angry about
it and say, "I don't want that. I don't think smokers
deserve a special preference." So they add this new
amendment to the constitution. Is it unconstitutional
because smokers have been-
Well, if they were to say because states remain free
to restructure the political process.
Yes, that's true.
What they are not free to do, however, is to have that
restructuring done in an impartial way. True, this is
not a situation where they have been denied the right
to vote. Gays and lesbians retain the right to vote.
What they don't have is the right to participate in the
process in the sense that every other individual in
Colorado has, because every other individual in Col-
" See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5 (Supp. 1995). Although the statute does not
specifically address smoking, it prohibits employment discrimination against "any em-
ployee due to that employee's engaging in any lawful activity off the premises of the
employer during nonworking hours," with certain limited exceptions. Id. § 24-34-
402.5(1).
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orado is free to bring the claim. Only gays and lesbi-
ans. Now if Colorado were to say that people who
rent housing can never bring a claim of discrimina-
tion, I think it also would be a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.
Counsel, I don't want to cut you off, but I don't
think you have answered Justice Savage's question
about smokers, and I'd be very fascinated by your
answer. Smokers repulse some members of the Colo-
rado population, and they decide to bar smokers from
seeking antidiscrimination legislation, or any other
type of antidiscrimination-
And if every other individual is entitled-
Right.
-to bring a claim, if this is the way the question is
posited, I would say that seems to be very similar to
this situation.
Isn't that what constitutions are about? Doesn't our
Constitution's First Amendment say "Congress shall
make no law"?45 Constitutions appropriately fence
off areas of legislation that the makers of the consti-
tution, the populace, have deemed to be inappropri-
ate. Here in this hypothetical, it's inappropriate in
Colorado to protect so-called smokers' rights.
But the Federal Constitution says-and, of course we
know, trumps any state constitution-the Federal
Constitution says "[n]o state shall ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws."' What Colorado has done to gay and les-
bian individuals is to deny them the equal protection
of the law that every other citizen in Colorado is
entitled to receive, and that is why that this is a
violation of the equal protection clause.
Why is it irrational? Why is it irrational?
45 U.S. CONST. amend I.
4' U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
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Because only gays, and no one else, are singled out
in this way.
It's punitive but does that mean it's irrational?
No, it doesn't mean it's irrational, but the problem is
that it can't be explained in terms of a rational basis.
Colorado has not explained why gays and lesbians,
and only gays and lesbians, have been singled out in
this way.
Do you not think, not to change the focus here, but
you don't seem to be defending the decision below
on the grounds on which the Colorado Supreme
Court reached it.47 Do you have a fundamental right
argument? Do you have an argument against Hunter
v. Erickson?'8
Yes, absolutely. Absolutely and that is that the citi-
zens here are entitled-well, strike that. The State of
Colorado is entitled to restructure its political pro-
cess, but as the court said in Hunter-we disagree
with the petitioners that Hunter is solely about race.
Hunter is about restructuring the political process in
a discriminatory way, and as Justice Harlan made
clear in his separate opinion in Hunter, the state is
free to do so but it cannot do so in a way that denies
the opportunity to participate in the process in an
unequal manner.49 The reason why we're concerned
about that is not that we're not trying to mandate
results, and it's not about the Supreme Court coming
in and second-guessing what the legislature has done,
or even what the electorate has done, rather it's mak-
ing sure that everyone has the chance to participate
in the process and the procedures of the law. And
that is not the case in Colorado, because again, gays
and lesbians, and only gays and lesbians, are re-
moved and denied access to the protection of
Colorado's laws.
47 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
4 Id. at 393 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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How can you explain James, which was the case in
which we refused to take this beyond the suspect
class?
Right, in fact-
When have we ever taken this beyond the suspect
class?
The difference here-you're right-James was a case
that rejected poverty as a suspect class. James also
considered and rejected a claim that any measure
which sets up a different process for adopting a
legislation on a particular issue violates the Equal
Protection Clause. ° This is not about changing a
process, this is about completely denying to gays and
lesbians any chance to receive the protection of
Colorado's laws that it gives to everybody else. You
don't have to touch James, or James in no way pre-
vents you from affirming the lower court. James
said, "Yes, it doesn't violate equal protection for a
local community, or for that matter, a state, to adopt
a different process or procedure for a particular issue
in that case public housing." This is not about a
particular process. This is about completely denying
all gays and lesbians any claim of discrimination, no
matter how arbitrary, how unwarranted, how invidi-
ous that discrimination is.
Counselor, Colorado has another constitutional
amendment that forbids incumbent elected officials
from exceeding a certain number of terms.5 How is
that one fencing out a category?
Because it doesn't say, for example, only Republi-
cans or only Socialists shall be given two terms, or
whatever number of terms it is. It says to all people
who have been incumbents, you cannot repeat your
term after a certain number of terms.
Why is it necessary to add your qualifier?
5o U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
" COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 9a, 1 1.
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Because Colorado treats all individuals who held
office in an equal manner. In this case, Colorado has
not treated gays and lesbians in an equal manner.
How do you explain other constitutional amend-
ments, other constitutional sections, that fence out
people, such as the Establishment Clause,52 which
fences out the Catholic church from ever getting tax
money for its parochial schools, or the right of priva-
cy,53 which prevents pro-lifers from ever getting to
abortion bans.
Well, I'm not sure I see the analogy. I mean, the
First Amendment-the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment--or the Establishment Clause, which is
the first one to which you referred, sets out a prin-
ciple. It doesn't say that only the Catholic church
shall not be entitled to tax funds. If a statute were to
say that only the Catholic Church is not entitled to
tax funds, that would be an open and shut First
Amendment violation.
Churches generally, then.
That's the Establishment Clause. That's the principle
on which the Federal Constitution was established.
The Equal Protection Clause establishes another
principle. The principles sometimes may seem to
clash, but I don't see where the analogy necessarily
requires this Court to overrule the lower court opin-
ion or reverse the lower court.
Here it's the same principle as in Bowers v.
Hardwick.
No, it's not.
On the condition of heterosexuality.
52 U.S. CONST. amend I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion . . ").
" See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
1995] 667
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
MR. MACLIN:
THE COURT:
MR. GERHARDT:
THE COURT:
MR. GERHARDT:
Well, in Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court said it was
okay to criminalize sodomy. 4 Now, as I said, this
case does not require the Court to say that gays and
lesbians are a suspect class, or even for that matter,
that sodomy is a fundamental right. All this Court
has to say in this case to affirm the lower court is
that you shall not deny protection of the law, as
demanded by the Equal Protection Clause. You can-
not single out a group or an individual to deny pro-
tection of the laws. I see my time is up.
Thank you. Mr. Gerhardt?
ORAL ARGUMENT OF
PROFESSOR MICHAEL GERHARDT
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER
Two brief points in rebuttal, Your Honor. The first is
going straight to the arguments about fundamental
rights. I think it's significant to note there was no
alteration of the state political process in this case. In
addition, the Respondents remain free to pursue the
same political process today that was in existence at
the time, and even before the referendum went into
effect. In other words, there was no change in the
political process that had anything to do with the
Respondents at all. What happened in this case is
somebody lost a referendum battle, and that same
somebody had achieved political victories in a pro-
cess that the state long ago had devised and had
complete control of.
What do you say to the question that we brought up
before-that the gay and lesbian community cannot
push for another local ordinance in Denver or Boul-
der, or wherever such ordinances have been in place
previously?
What I say to that, Your Honor, is that they never
had a constitutional right to obtain such ordinances in
the first place. In other words, Your Honor, there is
54 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
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no affirmative constitutional right that this group has
to achieve a political victory, in this area.
Was there prohibition against it? I'm not saying
necessarily there was a constitutional right, but was
there a prohibition against it before this amendment?
Your Honor, prohibition against?
Against that sort of local ordinance.
There was no state prohibition, but states do this all
the time. There are state-wide referenda all the time,
and there's state legislation that supersedes whatever
localities do. The critical point is that if Respondents
can base a constitutional argument on a political loss,
then state governments just simply cease to matter.
Would it make any difference to you if there was
evidence that proponents of this amendment really
had animus, really hated homosexuals?
Would it make a difference?
Yes.
I don't think so, Your Honor, because it has long
been understood that this Court gives great deference
to referenda because it is the one process in which
the people speak. And it may well be true that some
of those people did have animus, but as Chief Justice
Marshall said in Fletcher v. Peck,55 it may be that
bad people passed some laws, but that's no reason to
strike them down.56 You look at the law to see if
the law itself reflects, in so many words, and in so
many ways the animus.
" 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87 (1810).
56 Id. at 125 (observing that "a court, sitting as a court of law, cannot sustain a suit
between individuals founded on the allegation that the act is a nullity in consequence of
the impure motives which influenced certain members of the legislature which passed
the law").
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I think it would make a difference if we could dis-
cern animus in this amendment.
Well, it makes a difference in that-then I misspoke,
Your Honor. I may have misunderstood your ques-
tion. Animus may make a difference if that were all
there were, but that's not by any means all there is in
this case.
Thank you, Mr. Gerhardt.
Thank you.
DECISION
After thirty minutes of public deliberation, the Court ruled five to four
to strike down Colorado Amendment 2. The participants were less confident
that the United States Supreme Court would follow suit.
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